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ALL OF A PIECE THROUGHOUT: THE FOUR
AGES OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah*
This paper divides up the history of U.S. internationaltaxation into
four periods, on the basis of what was the basic theoretical principle
underlying the major legislative enactments made in each period. The
first period lasted from the adoption of the Foreign Tax Credit in 1918
to the end of the Eisenhower Administration,and was dominated by the
concept of the right to tax as flowing from benefits conferred by the
taxing state. The second period lasted from 1960 until the end of the
Carter Administration, and was dominated by the concept of capital
export neutrality and an emphasis on residence-based taxation. The
third period lasted from 1981 until 1997, and was driven by the need to
preserve the competitiveness of the U.S. economy in an increasingly
globalized marketplace, resulting in an emphasis on source-based
taxation, albeit with significant exceptions. The last period began with
the decision to cooperate with the OECD's harmful tax competition
project in 1998, and is marked by a continuous attempt to coordinate
residence and source taxation to prevent both double taxation and
double nontaxation.
Three general observations can be made on this evolution: (1) In
some ways surprisingly little has changed in the course of the last
hundred years: U.S. internationaltaxation is still dominated by the need
to balance the desire to prevent both double taxation and complete tax
avoidance with sustaining the competitive position of U.S. businesses.
(2) Although it is possible to detect some measure of cyclicality, in that
the emphasis shifts from source to residence to source and back to
residence again, the underlying balance does not shift very significantly,
and the various theories advanced appear more as convenient support
Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan. I would like to
thank Hugh Ault, Steve Bank, Joe Guttentag, Eran Lempert, Charles McLure, Neil
Rollings, David Rosenbloom, David Tillinghast, Phil West, and participants in the
2005 UCLA tax history conference for helpful comments. Any errors are mine.
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for pre-existing policy preferences than the real reason for policy
changes. (3) On the basis of the history, it seems unlikely that the U.S.
will in the near future make a clean break with the past either by
abandoning all source-based taxation of foreigners or all residencebased taxation of U.S. persons.
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If the truth were known, the authors doubt the validity of any
economic analysis in view of the generally poor quality of the
available statistics and the general ability of authors in the field to use
statistics for the support of their personal views.'

1 Alan G. Choate et al., Federal Tax Policy for Foreign Income and Foreign
Taxpayers-History,Analysis and Prospects,44 TEMP. L.Q. 441, 443 n.3 (1971).
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The Four Ages of U.S. InternationalTaxation
I.

INTRODUCTION

Periodization is a notorious problem for historians. At least since
Alexis de Tocqueville's L'Ancien Rggime et la Rdvolution,2 historians
have been aware that even a well-established dividing line like 1789 is
fraught with difficulty and masks underlying continuities. Without
periodization, however, history risks becoming "just one damn fact
after another," lacking in both of Lytton Strachey's two requirements
for good historical writing - selectivity and a thesis.
This paper represents a preliminary attempt to periodize the
history of U.S. international taxation, and thereby also both presents a
thesis on its evolution and some tentative predictions of its future
course. This is uncharted territory for the historian, because with the
exception of Graetz and O'Hear's important article on the early years,
no meaningful historical work has been done on the topic.' I hope
that this preliminary attempt at defining the contours of the subject
will help spur more work on this interesting area, comparable to the
work Steven Bank and others have been doing on the history of the
corporate tax.4
In what follows, I divide up the history of U.S. international
taxation into four periods, on the basis of what I believe was the basic
theoretical principle underlying the major legislative enactments made
in each period. For each period, I try to identify the main principle,
the major players (restricted to people who held policy-making
positions), and some major developments that exemplify the
application of the principle in practice.
The first period lasted from the adoption of the Foreign Tax
Credit (FTC) in 1918 to the end of the Eisenhower Administration,
and was dominated by the concept of the right to tax as flowing from
benefits conferred by the taxing state. This, as Graetz and O'Hear
point out, resulted in an emphasis on source-based taxation, although
I believe they exaggerate the extent of that emphasis as well as the
relative importance of Thomas Adams, while downplaying the
contribution of Edwin Seligman.
The second period lasted from 1960 until the end of the Carter
Administration. It was dominated by the concept of capital export

2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, L'ANCIEN RtGIME ET LA RtVOLUTION (1856).
3 Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S.

InternationalTaxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021 (1997) [hereinafter Graetz & O'Hear].
4 In particular, the Stanley Surrey papers at Harvard Law School cry out for
an
examination similar to what Graetz and O'Hear did for the Adams papers at Yale.
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neutrality, an emphasis on residence-based taxation, as well as the
personality of Stanley Surrey. These ideas still had an impact in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986 Act) and beyond, but after 1981 they
were subjected to increasing criticism, which is still reflected in current
work by both academics and practitioners 5
The third period lasted from 1981 until 1997. The principal idea
dominating developments in this period was the need to preserve the
competitiveness of the U.S. economy in an increasingly globalized
marketplace. This resulted in an emphasis on source-based taxation,
albeit with significant exceptions designed to attract foreign capital
into the U.S., and a decrease in residence-based taxation.
It could be argued that the ideas developed in the third period are
still dominant, and they certainly continue to resonate in debates in
Washington, DC.6 However, I would argue that beginning with the
decision to cooperate with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) harmful tax competition
project in 1998, and continuing (surprisingly) into the Bush
Administration, a new period has started that is marked by a
continuous attempt to coordinate residence and source taxation to
prevent both double taxation and double nontaxation. This type of
coordination is a different kind of response to globalization than the
typical competitive move of the third period, and therefore justifies
marking post-1998 developments as a new period.
There are three general observations that can be made on this
evolution. The first is that in some ways surprisingly little has changed
in the course of the last hundred years: U.S. international taxation is
still dominated by the same kind of concerns that troubled Adams and
Seligman in the 1910s and 1920s, namely how to balance the desire to
prevent both double taxation and complete tax avoidance with
sustaining the competitive position of U.S. businesses. The second
one is that although it is possible to detect some measure of cyclicality,
See, e.g., William P. McClure & Herman B. Bouma, The Taxation of Foreign
Income from 1909 to 1989: How a Tilted PlayingField Developed, 43 TAx NoTEs 1379
(June 12, 1989) (describing the pre-1960s period as a golden age and decrying the
continuing influence of Surrey's ideas); Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54
TAX L. REV. 261 (2001); James R. Hines, Jr., The Case Against Deferral: A Deferential
Reconsideration,52 NAT'L TAX J. 385 (1999).
6 See, for example, the papers presented at the recent conference
on "The U.S.
International Tax Regime: Confronting the Challenge of the Evolving Global
Marketplace," organized by the Tax Council Policy Institute in Washington, DC (Feb.
10-11, 2005), available at www.tcpi.org [hereinafter TCPI Conference Papers].
5
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in that the emphasis shifts from source to residence to source and
back to residence again, the underlying balance does not shift very
significantly, and the various theories advanced appear more as
convenient support for pre-existing policy preferences than the real
reason for policy changes. Finally, on the basis of this history, it seems
unlikely that the U.S. will in the near future make a clean break with
the past either by abandoning all source-based taxation of foreigners
(as suggested by some fundamental tax reform proposals such as the
Flat Tax) or all residence-based taxation of U.S. persons (as suggested
by some advocates of complete territoriality).' Instead, we are likely
to see gradual reforms of the existing system, perhaps with some
increased measure of coordination with other countries.
II. THE AGE OF BENEFITS (1918-1960)
The formative period of the U.S. international tax regime, as well
as the overall international tax regime, was (as Graetz and O'Hear
first pointed out) the period between the two World Wars. However,
the first period can legitimately be extended through the end of the
Eisenhower Administration, since the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
embodies, with very few changes, the consensus reached in the 1920s
and 1930s.
A. Principle

The major principle underlying the U.S. international tax regime
in this period was the idea that taxing jurisdiction should be based on
benefits conferred by the taxing state. This may seem surprising since
in the domestic context the shift from personal property taxation to
income taxation was accompanied by a shift in the underlying
rationale of taxation from benefits to ability to pay, as illustrated by
the work of Seligman and others. 8 However, in the international
context, "ability to pay" immediately raises the question "whose
ability?", and to answer this question, tax analysts then and today
refer to the notion of benefits.
This emphasis can be found in the work of all three principal
7 See supra note 6 for a discussion of both proposals.
8 For a discussion of this shift, see RICHARD J. JOSEPH, THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN INCOME TAX: THE REVENUE ACT OF

1894

AND ITS AFTERMATH

(2004);

Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Equity Versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in Historical
Perspective, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE 25 (Joseph J. Thorndike &
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002).
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American figures of this period - Thomas Adams, the Yale
economics professor who was the principal international tax adviser to
the U.S. Treasury in the 1910s and 1920s; Edwin Seligman, the
Columbia economics professor who was the guiding spirit behind the
1923 "four economists" report to the League of Nations (1923
Report), which laid the foundations for the international tax regime;
and Mitchell Carroll, the lawyer who founded International Fiscal
Association (IFA) and was involved in the League's early model tax
treaties.
Thomas Adams, as Graetz and O'Hear pointed out, clearly
emphasized the costs imposed by business as a justification for taxing
business at source: "[B]usiness ought to be taxed because it costs
money to maintain a market and those costs should in some way be
distributed over all the beneficiaries of that market."9 This emphasis
on benefits taxation led Adams to justify source-based taxation:
"Every state insists upon taxing the nonresident alien who derives
income from source [sic] within that country, and rightly so, at least
inevitably so.''a
However, in my opinion Graetz and O'Hear exaggerate Adams'
preference for source-based taxation. Adams thought that it was
generally justified on benefits grounds to tax at source, although the
last cite suggests that it may have been more the practical inevitability
of source taxation than its theoretical justification that led him to this
emphasis. But Adams was never an advocate of pure source taxation;
he was, after all, the main architect of the FTC, which was explicitly
based on a rejection of pure source taxation, i.e., a continental
European-type exemption system. Adams' preference for the credit
was grounded explicitly in his concern that pure source-based taxation
would lead to double nontaxation: "[T]he state which with a fine
regard for the rights of the taxpayer takes pains to relieve double
taxation, may fairly take measures to ensure the person or property
pays at least one tax."'" Moreover, Adams acknowledged that
Thomas S. Adams, The Taxation of Business, PROC. 11TH ANN. CONF., NAT'L
TAX ASS'N 185, 186 (1917); Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 3, at 1036.
10 Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 3, at 1037 (quoting Thomas S. Adams,
9

Internationaland Interstate Aspects of Double Taxation, PROC. 22D ANN. CONF. ON
TAX'N, NAT'L TAX ASS'N, 193, 197 (1929)). The same recognition of the inevitability
of source taxation is reflected in Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the
FinancialComm., League of Nations Doc. E.F.S. 73 F.19, 40 (1923) [hereinafter 1923
Report].
1 Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 3, at 1039 n.72 (quoting Thomas S. Adams,
Interstate and International Double Taxation, in LECTURES ON TAXATION 112-13
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progressive taxation, which he supported since his Wisconsin
days,
12
system.
source-based
exclusively
an
in
was not possible
Graetz and O'Hear also mischaracterize the views of Edwin
Seligman, whom they portray as an advocate of pure residence-based
taxation. 13 While it is true that the 1923 Report, of which Seligman
was the principal author, rejects the "exchange" (benefits) theory of
tax in favor of the "faculty" (ability to pay) theory, this is merely a
background, theoretical preference, similar to modern economists'
theoretical preference for pure residence taxation. 14 In practice, the
1923 Report acknowledges the inevitability of source-based taxation,
and moreover, attempts to ground both source and residence taxation
in a benefits-based concept, "economic allegiance." Consider, for
example, the following:
[T]he taxes, though measured by things, eventually fall upon
persons and ought to fall upon them in the aggregate
according to the total resources of the individual.... [W]hen
the money has left the pocket of the individual, its destination
is not a single one but is due to all those governments to
whom the individual owes economic allegiance....
In the attempt to discover the true meaning of economic
allegiance, it is clear that there are three fundamental
considerations: that of (1) production of wealth; that of (2)
possession of wealth; that of (3) disposition of wealth. We
have to ask where wealth is really produced, i.e., where does
it really come into existence; where is it owned; and, finally,
where is it disposed of?
By production of wealth we mean all the stages which are
involved up to the point of the wealth coming to fruition, that
is, all the stages up to the point when the physical production
has reached a complete economic destination and can be
acquired as wealth. The oranges upon the trees in California
are not acquired wealth until they are picked, and not even at
(Roswell Magill ed., 1932)).
12 Id. at 1040.
13

Id. at 1035.

14 1923 Report, supra note 10, at 18. For the position of modern economists,
see,

e.g., Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing InternationalIncome: An Analysis of
the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
11 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990); Joel B. Slemrod, Free Trade Taxation and
ProtectionistTaxation, 2 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 471 (1995).
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that stage until they are packed, and not even at that stage
until they are transported to the place where demand exists
and until they are put where the consumer can use them.
These stages, up to the point where wealth reaches fruition,
may be shared in by different territorial authorities. By
disposition of wealth we mean the stage when the wealth has
reached its final owner, who is entitled to use it in whatever
way he chooses. He can consume it or waste it, or re-invest it;
but the exercise of his will to do any of these things resides
with him and there his ability to pay taxes is apparent. By
possession of wealth we refer to the fact that between the
actual fruition of production into wealth and the disposing of
it in consumption there is a whole range of functions relating
to establishing the title to wealth and preserving it. These are
largely related to the legal framework of society under which
a man can reasonably expect to make his own what has been
brought into existence. A country of stable government and
laws which will render him those services without which he
could not enter into the third stage of consumption with
confidence is a country to which he owes some economic
allegiance."
This definition of "economic allegiance" is clearly based on a benefits
theory of taxation, which is used to justify both what we would regard
as source-based taxation ("production of wealth") and what we would
regard as residence-based taxation ("possession of wealth" and
"disposition of wealth").
Finally, Mitchell Carroll's primary innovation, the idea that
profits should be apportioned among taxing states but no state should
tax business profits that were not earned through a "permanent
establishment," likewise rested on the notion that taxation of business
is justified by the benefits conferred by the taxing states and that, in
the absence of a permanent establishment, those benefits are too
minute to justify taxation.16

15
16

1923 Report, supra note 10, at 20, 22-23.
Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law: Benefits for American Investors

and EnterprisesAbroad, 2 INT'L LAW. 692, 701 (1968); Graetz & O'Hear, supra note
3, at 1088.
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B. Players

Graetz and O'Hear consistently emphasize the role of Adams,
whom they describe as the "founder" of the U.S. system of
international taxation. 7 They also argue that previous writers have
overemphasized the role of Seligman and the 1923 Report, which
(they argue) had no real impact on the subsequent development of the
treaty regime by the League. 8
There is no question that Adams played the principal role in
forming U.S. international tax policy in the late 1910s and early 1920s,
and Graetz and O'Hear made an important contribution in bringing
that role to light and in using the Adams papers at Yale to reveal
many interesting facts about the "original intent" of U.S. international
taxation. However, I believe they both exaggerate the role played by
Adams, and undervalue the role of the 1923 Report and of Seligman.
Adams was clearly the guiding spirit behind both the original
adoption of the FTC in 1918 and the adoption of the overall limitation
in 1921 (designed, it should be noted, to preserve U.S. residencebased taxation of its residents on U.S. source income). However, as
Graetz and O'Hear describe it, the FTC was miraculously adopted by
Congress merely because of Adams' proposal, at a time when
revenues were badly needed for the war. As they note, "[t]he FIC
represented what was an extraordinarily generous measure for its
time ....Such generosity was virtually unprecedented.' '19 They then
state that "[t]o Adams' surprise, the FTC provoked little opposition
(or indeed notice) and became law in 1919. " 2

It seems to me highly unlikely that the FTC was adopted
primarily due to Adams' influence. Instead, I would suggest that the
main reason for the difference between the U.K., which argued for
pure residence-based taxation, and the U.S., which adopted the FTC,
had to do with the different relationships between business and
government in the two countries. In the U.K., the government's
position reflected the revenue concerns of a capital exporting country.
In the U.S., Congress is much more amenable to lobbying by
businesses, and in the post-war atmosphere (the 1918 Act was actually
enacted in 1919) was particularly open to arguments about double
17

Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 3, at 1027.

18

Id.

19
20

Id. at 1045-46.
Id. at 1047; see also id. at 1072 (listing three factors behind the U.S. position in

favor of the FTC, two of which are based on Adams' views, but not mentioning the

views of U.S. business interests).
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taxation, given the high post-war tax rates in Europe.
Nor do I think that Adams himself was immune to such practical
considerations. Much of his post-war work was done through the
International Chamber of Commerce, and he was generally receptive
to competitiveness arguments. 21 His 1921 unsuccessful effort to enact
an exemption regime for "foreign trade corporations" (the first in a
long list of dubious export subsidies) shows both his affiliation with
pro-business interests, and the limits of his influence even in a
Republican Congress (the provision was defeated under attack by
Senator LaFollette, arguing that it represented an inequitable tax
break for the wealthy and that it would encourage the flight of capital
22
and jobs abroad).
On the other hand, I believe Graetz and O'Hear underestimate
the importance of the 1923 Report and of its principal author, Edwin
Seligman. It is true, as they argue, that the ultimate League models
were drafted by a committee of technical experts, who relied on the
work of earlier treaty drafters and paid little attention to the
theoretical arguments of the 1923 Report. However, the 1923 Report
contained two crucial innovations that laid the groundwork for all
subsequent work by the League. First, the 1923 Report (building on
earlier examples, including the U.S. source rules) laid great emphasis
on the classification of income into various categories, primarily active
and passive. Second, and crucially, the 1923 Report was the first work
by representatives of capital exporting and importing countries to lay
out the fundamental compromise underlying the treaty network,
under which active (business) income should be taxable primarily at
source, while passive (investment) income should be taxable primarily
at residence. This compromise is reflected theoretically in earlier
work by Adams, 3 but its adoption by the four economists in the 1923
Report was primarily due to the influence of Seligman, who mediated
successfully between the extreme positions taken by the
representatives from capital importing countries (Italy and Belgium)
U.K.). 2 ' This compromise was
and capital exporting countriesof(the
the League technical experts and in
reflected in the later positions
21
22

Id. at 1049-50.
Id. at 1062.

23 Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 3, at 1036-41.
24

1923 Report, supra note 10, at 45-51; Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 3, at 1065

("The personal income tax is laid upon the individual in his capacity of consumer, and
is paid where he resides; whereas the business income tax is paid by men in their
productive or commercial capacity at the place where the income is earned.")
(quoting Adams, supra note 9, at 193).
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the League models, and it is highly unlikely that it was reached in that
context without regard to the earlier agreement embodied in the
League-sponsored 1923 Report.
Finally, more credit than Graetz and O'Hear give should be
bestowed on Carroll, who was not just "Adams' assistant" but was the
author of the most important pre-war study of the allocation of
income among taxing jurisdictions, as well as a principal mover behind
the main limitation on source taxation in the League models, namely
the permanent establishment.
C. Applications

Many of the major foundation stones of the current international
tax regime were laid in this period, and they all reflect the impact of
the predominant benefit theory of taxation. The FTC, as we have
seen, resulted from Adams' belief in the (benefits-based) justification
of source-based taxation, added to his refusal to allow double
nontaxation. The overall limitation, enacted in 1921, resulted from
the reality of higher foreign tax rates and Congress's disinclination to
permit the FTC to override U.S. taxation of U.S. residents on U.S.
source income, which again reflected a benefits view.
The 1923 compromise and the subsequent model treaties reflected
Seligman's view that while pure residence-based taxation may be an
ideal for the future, in practice source-based taxation would persist
and therefore there should be a division between source and residence
jurisdictions based on the degree of benefits accorded different types
of income.2' The concept of "economic allegiance" itself was based, as
we have seen, on a benefits analysis that justified both source and
residence taxation.
The permanent establishment limitation on source taxation
likewise reflects Carroll's view that in the absence of a permanent
establishment, the benefits accorded were too tenuous to justify
taxation by the source state. 26 Carroll's work on apportionment of
profits among taxing jurisdictions likewise reflected the benefits
principle.27
These innovations continued to form the major building blocks of
U.S. international taxation through the end of the 1950s. Attempts to
eliminate the FTC in the 1930s were defeated, although the overall
25
26
27

1923 Report, supra note 10, at 40-42, 45-51.
See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 16, at 701, 705-06.
Id. at 703-06.
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limitation was replaced in 1932 with the more restrictive per country
limitation to prevent averaging. The only major new ideas were the
introduction in 1935 of final gross-based withholding taxes on passive
income earned by nonresidents, which was motivated by
administrative necessity, and the introduction of the foreign personal
holding company regime in 1937, which prefigured later developments
but was justified purely on equity grounds. Overall, as McClure and
Bouma point out, the "playing field" in 1959 (when a proposal to
grant partial exemption to some domestic corporations was soundly
defeated) was essentially the same as that established in the early
1920s.28
III. THE AGE OF NEUTRALITY (1961-1980)

As both Graetz and O'Hear and McClure and Bouma
emphasized (from different perspectives), the advent of the Kennedy
Administration brought about a profound change in the nature of the
principle underlying U.S. international taxation. Gone was the old
emphasis on benefits and fairness; instead, the argument was
henceforward based on the economic concept of efficiency, which in
the international context translated into neutrality (and in particular,
capital export neutrality). This shift marked the emergence of a new
orthodoxy that was to become dominant in the 1960s and 1970s, and
that was still evident (albeit under constant attack) as recently as 2000.
The principal author of this shift, and the principal (albeit
unnamed) target of the critiques of both Graetz and O'Hear and
McClure and Bouma, was the Harvard law professor who became the
first Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Stanley Surrey. Surrey's spirit
hovers over current debates on the proper direction of U.S.
international taxation much more prominently than those of either
Adams or Seligman. When both Graetz and O'Hear and McClure
and Bouma criticized the emphasis on residence taxation and on
neutrality in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is Surrey who is the true
target of their attacks, rather than Seligman. When they come to
make practical suggestions for reform, it is Surrey's Subpart F, rather
than Adams' FTC or Seligman's distinction between active and
passive income that was the object of the attack.

28

See generally McClure & Bouma, supra note 5.
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A. Principle

The shift to the new principle of neutrality can be seen most
clearly in Secretary Dillon's 1961 address to the Committee on Ways
and Means, proposing to end deferral by taxing currently all income
of foreign corporations controlled by U.S. persons. Secretary Dillon
justified the proposal in the following terms:
It is sometimes contended that if U.S. firms are to compete
successfully abroad they must enjoy as favorable a tax
treatment as their foreign competitors. I believe that this
argument has been overly stressed. A difference in tax rates,
I said before, should not handicap companies producing
abroad, although it may slow the rate of expansion. But even
if this argument were fully valid, it could not be a decisive
objection to our proposal. As long as the tax systems of
various countries differ-and I venture to predict that this
will be the case for years to come-we must make a firm
choice. Either we tax the foreign income of U.S. companies
at U.S. tax rates and credit income taxes paid abroad, thereby
eliminating the tax factor in the U.S. investor's choice
between domestic and foreign investment; or we permit
foreign income to be taxed at the rates applicable abroad,
thereby removing the impact, if any, which tax rate
differences may have on the competitive position of the
American investor abroad. Both types of neutrality cannot
be achieved at once. I believe that reasons of tax equity as
well as reasons of economic policy clearly dictate that in the
case of investment in other industrialized countries we should
give priority to tax neutrality in the choice between
investment here and investment abroad2 9
The two types of neutrality referred to were of course what came
to be known as "capital export neutrality" (CEN) (neutrality in
location of investment) and "capital import neutrality" (CIN)
(neutrality in source of investment). Both types, as well as the
preference for CEN over CIN, were first developed by the economist
Peggy Richman (later Peggy Musgrave) in her 1963 book, The
29

President's

Tax

Message

Along

With

Principal

Statement,

Detailed

Explanation, and Supporting Exhibits and Documents: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong. 30 (1961) (statement of Douglas Dillon,
Treas. Sec'y).
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Taxation of Foreign Investment Income.3 °
In drafting Dillon's
statement, Surrey decided to use the more scientific economist's
terms, rather than the traditional emphasis on equity or fairness, as
the major argument in favor of the proposal to end deferral.
Arguably, there was no need in 1961 to rely on CEN as a
justification for ending deferral. The actual mechanism proposed by
the Kennedy Administration to achieve this aim, namely a deemed
dividend of the earnings of "controlled foreign corporations" (CFCs)
to their U.S. shareholders, was the same one Congress adopted in
1937 for "foreign personal holding corporations" (FPHCs) on pure
equity grounds. 3' Assuming that the Administration and Congress
believed in taxing U.S. corporations on a residence basis, the same
equity argument (that it is unfair to distinguish between U.S.
corporations earning only U.S. source income and U.S. corporations
earning some foreign source income through their subsidiaries) could
have been made in 1961 as well.
Moreover, a careful reading of Secretary Dillon's statement
reveals what contemporary observers like David Tillinghast have also
stated, namely that the principal reason for the proposal to end
deferral had little to do with CEN, and a lot to do with concern over
the U.S. balance of payments, which had deteriorated rapidly in the
late 1950s as U.S. multinationals expanded their operations abroad.32
In an era in which every dollar was supposed to be backed with gold
reserves, this deterioration posed a real threat that foreign holders of
dollars could cause a "run" on Fort Knox. Dillon's statement devotes
over three pages to discussing this problem, compared to the single
paragraph devoted to CEN.3 3 Moreover, the adoption of Subpart F
was followed in 1963 by the interest equalization tax, which was aimed
directly at another aspect of the balance of payment problem - the
higher interest rates available overseas.
However, the emphasis on CEN "stuck" and became the mainstay
of U.S. international tax policy. For example, in the 1977 Blueprints
for Basic Tax Reform (written primarily by the late Republican
economist David Bradford), CEN was given as a major reason for
30

PEGGY B. RICHMAN, TAXATION

OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: AN

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1963).

The ideas behind this book were circulating before
1960, and it is widely recognized as the source of both CEN and CIN in Dillon's
address.
31 Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-377, 50 Stat. 813. §§ 201-207.
32 David R. Tillinghast, The Passage of the Revenue Act of 1962: Subpart Fat its
Birth, presented at TCPI Conference Session 1, supra note 6, at 5-6.
33 See President's Tax Message, supra note
29.
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34

preferring residence-based over source-based taxation. The same
emphasis can be found in numerous Treasury publications in the
1970s and 1980s.3" As late as the 2000 Treasury Study of Subpart F,
CEN is still defended as the mainstay of U.S. international tax
policy. 36 After 1960, neutrality became the dominant normative
argument, while what was arguably the main reason for enacting
Subpart F, namely the balance of payment issue, disappeared after
President Nixon's 1971 decision to cease backing the dollar with gold
reserves.
B. Players

The dominant player in the 1960s was undoubtedly Stanley
Surrey. As the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy from 1961 to 1969,
he was behind every major tax initiative of the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations, including in particular Subpart F (1962), the Foreign
Investment Tax Act (1966), and the transfer pricing regulations
(1968). Nor did Surrey's influence disappear after he returned to
Harvard. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 was clearly influenced by him,
as was the tax expenditure budget (1974), and even the 1986 Act could
still be seen as implementing his ideas (especially in regard to the FTC
and the "baskets"). Outside the U.S., Surrey was also a major player
in international organizations like the OECD (which issued its model
tax treaty in 1963 and its transfer pricing guidelines in 1977, both
heavily influenced by Surrey) and the UN (Surrey was the major force
behind the UN 1980 model tax treaty). As Stanley Langbein has
cleverly shown, Surrey's hand can be detected in many official
publications that do not mention him as their author.37
Despite the overt emphasis on CEN, it could be argued that
Surrey's main goal was not so much the achievement of CEN, but
rather the prevention of double nontaxation. This emphasis can be
seen already in his 1959 fight against ratification of the treaty with
34

U.S.

DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 98-100

(1977).
35 See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS,
GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY

383 (1985) ("The longstanding position of the United

States that, as the country of residence, it has the right to tax worldwide income is
considered appropriate to promote tax neutrality in investment decisions.").
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED
THROUGH U.S.

CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS:

A

POLICY STUDY

(Dec.

2000).
37 Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length, 30

TAx NOTES 625 (Feb. 17, 1986).
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Pakistan, which contained a tax sparing provision. Surrey argued that
this would result in an unacceptable reduction in U.S. taxation of its
residents on U.S. source income, and that it was inconsistent with the
38
purpose of the FTC and equivalent to tax exemption. The result was
that the Senate rejected the treaty, and that the U.S. thereafter
adopted its inflexible position (which remains in force today) in
opposition to tax sparing as a means of fostering development.
The same emphasis on preventing double nontaxation can be seen
in some of the provisions of Subpart F, especially the base company
rules and the branch rule." In both cases, U.S. multinationals were
using low tax jurisdictions (especially Switzerland) to avoid both U.S.
and foreign taxation of the same income. Surrey took the view that
this was inconsistent with CEN and with the concept of worldwide
taxation of residents.
The same idea underlay his emphasis on
transfer pricing enforcement as well, since a major purpose of the
transfer pricing regulations was to bolster the Internal Revenue
Service (Service) in cases like DuPont (involving a base company in
Switzerland) .41

Moreover, Surrey, like Adams before him, emphasized the role of
the U.S. in achieving international cooperation in preventing double
nontaxation. His major innovations, Subpart F and the transfer
pricing regulations, were copied by other countries and became a new
international baseline through the OECD.
Surrey's principal assistant at the Treasury in the early years was
David Tillinghast, who effectively was the first International Tax
Counsel. Through his work at the Treasury and later at IFA,
Tillinghast was a major force in implementing some of Surrey's ideas
in the 1960s and later. Other Surrey prot6g6s such as Paul McDaniel
and Hugh Ault likewise played important roles in maintaining
Surrey's influence after he left public office.
C. Applications

The principal application of the new principle of CEN was
obviously Subpart F, enacted in 1962 after a major fight in Congress
38 Stanley S. Surrey, The Pakistan Tax Treaty and "Tax Sparing," 11 NAT'L TAX

J. 156 (1958).
39 I.R.C. § 954(d); see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 36, at
xiiixiv.
40 See President's Tax Message, supra note 29.
41 E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. United States, 1978 WL 3449 (Ct.C1.
Trial Div.).
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over the competing claims of CEN and competitiveness. It is common
to assert that Subpart F as enacted represented a compromise
between CEN and competitiveness, in that the Administration gave
up on taxing CFCs on all of their income. While that is true, in
practice the Administration got over 90% of what it wanted, because
(as David Tillinghast has emphasized) in the early 1960s the vast
majority of active U.S. investment abroad went to high tax countries
42
Given that state of affairs, the
in Europe and to Canada.
Administration could give up on taxing active business income of
CFCs without diminishing CEN, since the taxes foregone by the U.S.
were in fact collected by other countries.4 ' Those situations in which
active business income could be earned without foreign tax were
explicitly dealt with by special provisions like the base company rules
and the branch rule. 44 It is also telling that while income that was
subject to foreign tax at 90% or more of the U.S. rate was excluded
from the reach of Subpart F, there was no corresponding provision
that included low-taxed income, precisely because active income was
unlikely to be low-taxed.
It is also common to assert that CEN, as applied by Surrey,
resulted in a preference for residence over source-based taxation.
This is Graetz and O'Hear's principal argument why the "original
intent" of U.S. international taxation, as developed by Adams, was
different from post-1960 development under Surrey and his
successors.4 6 However, just as it appears to me that Graetz and
O'Hear underplay the role of residence taxation for Adams, they
understate the importance of source taxation to Surrey. Both the
1966 Foreign Investors Tax Act (1966 Act),47 which invented the
concept of "effectively connected" income and thereby drew some
of
foreign source income into the U.S. taxing jurisdiction
S 48
nonresidents, and the 1968 transfer pricing regulations, were
designed to bolster U.S. source taxation. (Admittedly, the 1966 Act
also weakened source taxation by eliminating the force of attraction
42

Tillinghast, supra note 32.

43

Id.
I.R.C. § 954(d); see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 36, at xiii-

xiv.

I.R.C. § 954(b)(4); see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 36, at
149.
See Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 3, at 1041-60 (discussing Adams' work
regarding the FTC and source-based taxation).
47 Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539.
Treas. Reg. 1.482-2 (1968).
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rule, but this was done under budgetary pressure to attract foreign
passive investors.) Moreover, while Surrey was fully cognizant of the
U.S. interests as a capital exporting country, he was also clearly in
favor of source-based taxation, especially in the case of developing
countries, as shown by his work on the UN model treaty.49
I would argue that Surrey's principal positions, including the
prevention of double nontaxation by imposing residence tax on lowtaxed income of CFCs, and his defense of source-based taxation via
the transfer pricing regulations, were entirely consistent with the
positions taken by Adams in the FTC area and in the developments
leading to the 1920s compromise. What changed from 1920 to 1960
was not so much the policy, but rather the underlying principle, with
Adams emphasizing benefits and Surrey emphasizing neutrality.
IV. THE AGE OF COMPETITION (1981-1997)
A. Principle

As we have seen, Surrey's emphasis on neutrality, and especially
CEN, lasted well into the 1980s and even beyond. In some ways, the
1986 Act can be seen as the culmination of Surrey's ideas, both in its
general emphasis on base-broadening measures, and in the details of
its international provisions, such as the limitations on cross-crediting
via the basket regime, the expansion of Subpart F, the PFIC regime,
and the "super royalty" rule of section 482.50 Indeed, the best defense
of the international aspects of the 1986 Act was written by Charles
Kingson in his article, The Coherence of InternationalTaxation, which

is also the best contemporary academic exposition of Surrey's point of
view.51
However, from about 1980, CEN began to be subjected to
increasing criticism as an idea that was too attuned to global welfare
and not sufficiently cognizant of U.S. interests.52 In an era of
increasing globalization, it was felt that the U.S. should pay more
49 U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE
TAXATION
CONVENTION

BETWEEN

DEVELOPED

AND

DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES,

U.N. Doc.

ST/ESA/102, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XVI.3 (1980).
50 See generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
51 Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1151 (1981); see also Charles I. Kingson, The Foreign Tax Credit and Its Critics,
9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1 (1991).
52 See, e.g., McClure & Bouma, supra note 5; Graetz, supra note 5; Hines, supra
note 5.
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attention to the competitiveness of its multinationals in the face of
increasing foreign competition. In addition, the need to attract
increasingly mobile foreign capital led the U.S. to reduce source-based
taxation of foreign investment income, while at the same time the
increased emphasis on source taxation and budgetary pressures led to
increased source-based taxation of business income.
While some of the arguments were couched in neutrality terms
(such as CIN), the predominant emphasis of this period was on
competitiveness and competition. 3 Tax competition, and especially
competition for headquarters of multinational firms, was considered
either as a positive development or at least as something the U.S. had
to contend with. The new phenomenon of tax arbitrage (exploiting
differences in the tax rules of two countries to create double
nontaxation) was likewise considered a normal expression of different
country interests.
B. Players

While no U.S. policymaker dominated this period as much as
Adams or Surrey dominated theirs, three people stand out as
providing the principal theoretical rationales for the new unilateralist,
U.S.-first attitude that characterized U.S. international taxation in this
period: Charles McLure, David Rosenbloom, and Michael Graetz.
McLure was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy in the
early 1980s, and his main role was to formulate policy on state tax
issues and the formulary apportionment debate. He also played a
significant role in enacting the portfolio interest exemption, although
he later came to regret some of its effects, especially on capital flight
from Latin America. However, his main contribution in this context is
his theoretical work, both in defense of tax competition, and in his
vision of a world without income taxes to which tax competition could
lead.54

Rosenbloom was International Tax Counsel in the Carter
Administration and wrote an important article on U.S. treaty policy in
the early 1980s. His major contribution to the competitiveness
literature came in his 1998 Tillinghast lecture at New York University,
in which he launched an extensive attack on the notion of an
53 Id.
54

Charles E. McLure, Jr., Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation for

Income Taxes as the InternationalNorm, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 145 (1992); Charles E.
McLure, Tax Competition: Is What's Good for the Private Goose Also Good for the
Public Gander?, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 341 (1986).
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"international tax system" in the name of U.S. sovereignty, and an
extensive defense of tax arbitrage as the natural result of different
policy preferences among countries. 55
Finally, Graetz was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy in
the first Bush Administration. His major contributions in that role
were domestic, including the Treasury integration study, which led to
the adoption of partial integration in 2003, and the "Graetz plan" for
exempting most middle-class taxpayers from the income tax and
substituting a value-added tax.56 However, Graetz learned enough
about the importance of international taxation at the Treasury to
remake himself as the most prominent advocate of unilateralism and
source-based taxation and the most thorough critic of CEN in the
1990s. His main contributions in this vein were his attack on CEN in
his Tillinghast lecture (1997), his advocacy of territoriality, and last
but not least, his historical studies of the Adams period, which he used
as a vehicle to call for an abandonment of Surrey's emphasis on CEN
and residence-based taxation in favor of equity and source-based
taxation.57
C. Applications

The new emphasis on competition and unilateralism was already
evident in the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act
(FIRPTA), 58 enacted in the waning days of the Carter Administration
as a way to "get" foreign (especially Japanese) investors who allegedly
profited from U.S. economic malaise in the 1970s to buy U.S. real
55 H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: International Tax

Arbitrageand the "InternationalTax System," 53 TAX L. REV. 137 (2000).
56

See U.S.

DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTEGRATION

OF THE INDIVIDUAL

AND

CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (Jan. 1992); U.S. DEP'T
OF TREASURY,

A

RECOMMENDATION FOR INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND

CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS (Dec. 1992); Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
Integration of the U.S. Corporateand Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Sept. 27, 1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 1999 TNT

186-89) (examining Treasury reports relating to integrating individual and corporate
taxes in the U.S.).
57 Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54
TAX L. REV. 261 (2001); Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International
Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 537 (2003); Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 3; Michael
J. Graetz & Paul W. Oosterhuis, Structuringan Exemption System for Foreign Income
of U.S. Corporations,54 NAT'L TAX J. 771 (2001).
58 Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-499, 94
Stat. 2682.
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property at "fire sale" prices. A similar emphasis on "leveling the
playing field" with foreigners can be seen behind the branch profit tax
provisions of the 1986 Act (including a statutory treaty override) 9 and6
in the earnings stripping limitations on the deductibility of interest, 0
enacted in 1989 amid anxiety about foreign debt-financed takeovers of
U.S. firms.
The emphasis on competition, however, can be seen most clearly
in two trends that began in 1984. On the one hand, the budget deficit
and the increased mobility of capital led to a series of steps that
reduced U.S. source-based taxation of foreign investors, beginning
with the portfolio interest exemption (1984),61 continuing with the
source rule for derivatives (1991),62 and the expanded safe harbor for
passive investors in securities and commodities (1997). 6' The portfolio
interest exemption led to a world-wide trend toward exempting
foreigners from withholding taxes in the name of attracting mobile
capital.
On the other hand, increasing theoretical critiques of CEN and
the "tilted playing field" it produced for U.S. multinationals, reflected,
for example, in McClure and Bouma's article, led to a significant
reduction in the scope of Subpart F from 1994 to 1997. 64 This began
with the abolition of the short-lived section 956A in 1994, continued
with the nonapplication of the PFIC regime to CFCs in 1996, and
culminated with the banking and insurance exceptions, enacted over
President Clinton's veto in 1997.65 In addition, in an (arguably)
unplanned development, the extension of the "check the box" rules to
foreign entities in 1997 led to widespread avoidance of the base
company rules by using "disregarded entities." 66
Overall, the result of these developments has been a cutting back
on U.S. residence-based taxation of U.S. multinationals. In addition,
while in some ways there has been more emphasis on source-based
taxation of active income, in practice most of the new provisions
(FIRPTA, the branch profit tax, and earnings stripping) proved easy
to avoid, while competitive considerations led to significant erosion in
I.R.C. § 884.
I.R.C. § 1630).
61 I.R.C. § 871(h).
62 Treas. Reg. 1.863-7
(1991).
63 I.R.C. § 864(b)(2).
See generally McClure & Bouma, supra note 5.
65 U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 36, at 131-62 (listing the significant
59
60

amendments to Subpart F since 1962).
66 T.D.

8697, 1997-1 C.B. 215.
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U.S. source-based taxation of passive income.
V. THE AGE OF COOPERATION? (1998-)
A. Principle

Periodization becomes more and more difficult as one approaches
the present. In some ways, it can be argued, we still live in the age of
competitiveness, as indicated for example by the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA), 67 which cut back on some of the
measures adopted in 1986 and earlier (repeal of PFHC regime, worldwide interest expense allocation, reduction of the FTC baskets). In
my opinion, however, the AJCA changes were mostly justified
simplification measures, and the law is more remarkable for what it
did not do, namely enact any permanent move toward territoriality or
significant further reduction in the scope of Subpart F. This is
surprising because AJCA was enacted with the Republicans
dominating both houses of Congress and the White House, and with
unprecedented pressure from groups like the National Foreign Trade
Council (NFTC) toward a territorial regime in the name of
competitiveness.
Instead, I would argue that a new period began with the decision
of the Clinton Administration to cooperate with the OECD's harmful
tax competition initiative from 1998 onward. This period is marked
by a different response to globalization than unilateral competition acting in concert with our major trading partners to reduce both
double taxation and double nontaxation. Because the emphasis is on
concerted action, this move promises a way out from the need to
balance U.S. international tax policy goals with competitiveness
considerations. It thus has the potential of beginning a truly different
approach to integrating the U.S. and international tax regimes.
What is surprising is that when one examines in detail the changes
wrought by the Bush Administration, one discovers that (at least after
September 11, 2001) their underlying policy is consistent with the
goals pursued by the Clinton Administration. While the major push
towards cooperation is coming from the E.U., the U.S. has been more
receptive to this trend than some of the Administration's allies would
like. It may be that the Administration will in the future join in the
push toward unilateralism and territoriality in the name of
competitiveness, but so far it has shown few signs of doing so.

67

American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418.
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B. Players

The major players in this period are Hugh Ault, Joseph
Guttentag, and Philip West. Ault is the principal heir of Surrey's
mantle as an architect of the international tax regime, and was the
main theoretician behind the OECD's harmful tax competition
initiative. Guttentag was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy
and International Tax Counsel in the Clinton Administration, and
thereafter chaired the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs. West
wrote a major article critical of tax arbitrage and implemented some
of his views as International Tax Counsel and chair of the OECD's
harmful tax competition forum in the later years of the Clinton
Administration. 68
C. Applications

The most obvious examples of the new principle of cooperation in
practice are the OECD's harmful tax competition initiative 69 and the
E.U.'s Code of Conduct7 ° and Savings Directive." The OECD's
harmful tax competition initiative was aimed at both preferential tax
regimes within OECD member countries and at the tax havens. The
E.U.'s initiative was likewise aimed at preferential regimes within the
E.U. and at the taxation of interest earned by E.U. residents.
Both initiatives have, in my opinion, scored significant successes.
Most preferential regimes have been abolished within OECD
countries, and most tax havens have agreed to some degree of
information exchange. The Savings Directive is in force and requires
E.U. member countries to either cooperate in exchange of
information or impose high withholding taxes on interest paid to E.U.
residents.
However, both efforts are incomplete. Preferential regimes
flourish outside the OECD, the cooperation of the tax havens is
limited, and the Savings Directive does not apply to nonresidents. But
Philip R. West, Foreign Law in U.S. International Taxation: The Search for
Standards,3 FLA. TAX REV. 147 (1996).
69 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Harmful
Tax
Competition:An Emerging Global Issue (Apr. 9, 1998).
70 The Code of Conduct was set out in the conclusions of the Council
of
Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) meeting on December 1, 1997. Code of
Conduct for Business Taxation, 1998 O.J. (C 2) 3-5.
71 Council's directive on taxation of savings income in the form
of interest
payments. Council Directive 2003/48/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 38-48.
68
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even this partial success seemed impossible to attain when the Bush
Administration expressed its opposition to the whole endeavor in
early 2001. The need to cooperate after September 11, 2001 changed
the outlook and enabled the OECD and E.U. efforts to go forward.
For example, the Bush Administration scaled back, but did not
withdraw, regulations proposed by the Clinton Administration that
require U.S. banks to collect information on interest payments exempt
from withholding. This cooperation enabled the E.U.'s Savings
Directive, which was held back by U.K.'s fears of capital flight to the
U.S., to go into force.
Similarly, the two most prominent pronouncements of the Clinton
Treasury to combat double nontaxation, Notices 98-5 and 98-11, have
both been withdrawn."
But Congress has enacted measures
(section 901(k), as expanded in AJCA) to combat the FTC abuses
that were the target of Notice 98-5, and the Bush Administration has
repeatedly committed itself to prevent use of the FTC when there is
no threat of double taxation. Moreover, the approach underlying
Notice 98-11 has been continued in both recent proposals by the Joint
Committee on Taxation and in recent pushes by the Service to combat
abuses of the check the box rule. The principle underlying the
Notices, that double nontaxation is wrong even when the principal tax
avoided is a foreign tax, seems alive and well.
Another example of cooperation is the enactment of Code
section 894(c). This provision was designed to combat an arbitrage
transaction involving both entity and instrument arbitrage to achieve
double nontaxation. It overrides treaties (specifically, it was aimed at
the Canadian treaty) and was overwhelmingly passed by a Republican
Congress concerned that U.S. withholding taxes should not be
reduced when there is no corresponding tax by the residence country.
Finally, it is remarkable that a series of recent U.S. treaties,
including the U.K. and Australian treaties, negotiated by the Bush
Administration and ratified by a Republican Senate, 1contain
explicit
3
provisions designed to prevent double nontaxaton.
Specifically,
these recent U.S. treaties condition reduction of withholding taxes
upon taxation by the residence country.
In my opinion, the combination of these developments signals
72

Notice 98-5 was withdrawn in 2004-11 I.R.B. 606. Notice 98-11 was withdrawn

in 1998-27 I.R.B. 1.
73 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion, U.S.-U.K., July 19, 2002, S. TREATY Doc. No. 107-19; Protocol Amending
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion, U.S.-Austl., Sept. 21, 2001, S. TREATY Doc. No. 107-20.
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that despite some public pronouncements to the contrary, the Bush
Administration is in fact continuing the trend begun under Clinton of
addressing the pressures of globalization not through competition, but
through cooperation. If that proves to be a lasting change, it could
mark the most significant turning point in U.S. international tax policy
since the 1920s. Instead of unilateral emphasis on residence or source
taxation, we could have a regime of cooperation with our major
trading partners to preserve both residence and source taxation,
uphold the 1920s compromise, and avoid competitive pressures on our
multinationals.
VI. CONCLUSION

What can be learned from this brief historical outline? Three
points suggest themselves as potential lessons.
First, despite the shifting emphasis on residence or source, and
despite the changing nature of the underlying theoretical principles,
there has been a remarkable degree of continuity in U.S. international
taxation from 1918 to the present. The fundamental problem facing
Adams in 1918 was how to prevent both double taxation and double
nontaxation. This was the same problem Surrey grappled with in the
1960s, and we are still facing the issue today. Nor is the argument that
we need to do more to preserve the competitiveness of U.S.
businesses a new one - the same complaints were heard in the 1920s.
Thus, it would appear that previous writers (McClure and Bouma,
Graetz and O'Hear) overemphasize the discontinuities of U.S.
international taxation (and especially the sharp break that came with
Surrey's appearance in the 1960s) over the continuities.
Second, I would argue that the theoretical principles developed
above, and especially the economic theories (economic allegiance,
CEN, CIN, or nowadays CON, "capital ownership neutrality") were
really post-facto justifications for underlying policy results, rather than
14
Fundamentally, politicians are
the main drivers of legislation.
interested in concrete policies that affect their constituents (and their
prospects for re-election). It seems unlikely that any of the players
identified above, including even the academics, were driven primarily
by theoretical concepts, even though the changing nature of these
concepts marks convenient dividing points in the periodization
proposed above. The quote from 1971 that begins this paper still
74 For capital ownership neutrality (CON), see Mihir A. Desai & James R.

Hines, Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global Setting, 57
NAT'L TAX J. 937 (2004).
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holds true today: economic concepts can be manipulated too easily to
be the primary basis of policy outcomes, and this is just as true for
"obsolete" concepts like CEN as for new-fangled ones like CON.
Because of this, I believe Surrey made a mistake in adopting CEN
as the major rationale for his policies. Subpart F can be defended as a
simple extension of the desire to tax U.S. corporations on worldwide
income, which in turn stems (in my opinion) from the need to have a
tool to regulate U.S. corporate activity and limit managerial power.
This was obvious in 1961 (in fact, Dillon refers to the proposal as an
equity-based measure) and there was no need to introduce CEN into
the picture.
Finally, the relative stability of U.S. international taxation
described above may be coming to an end. With the new century and
increasing globalization, the time may indeed have come to abandon
the 1920s regime and the bilateral treaties that embody it. The
question is what will replace it - a renewed emphasis on unilateral
competition and territoriality, which might ultimately lead to
McLure's vision of a world without income taxes, or an increased
emphasis on multilateral cooperation and mutual adjustment of the
claims of source and residence countries in a way that prevents both
double taxation and double nontaxation.
At the beginning of another new century, it may thus be
appropriate, in this context, to slightly alter John Dryden's epitaph:
All, all of a piece throughout.
Thy chase had a beast in view;
Thy [debates] brought nothing about;
Thy [theories] were all untrue.
'Tis well an old age is out,
And time to begin a new."

John

Dryden,

The
Secular
Masque
http://eir.library.utoronto.ca/rpo/display/poem748.html.
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